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Abstract
Internet traffic is more voluminous than ever before in history. This data transmission
over a network involves a trade-off between efficiency and security. On the one hand, com-
pressing data can increase the efficiency if it leads to fewer bytes being sent, but this makes
the traffic susceptible to compression side-channel attacks. On the other hand choosing not
to compress makes it immune to such attacks but fails to maximize efficiency. CRIME and
BREACH are two compression side-channel attacks. These attacks exploiting the property
of dictionary compression, where an increase in redundancy in data leads to a better com-
pression. In addition to these, there are indirect attacks that can identify user behavior in
spite of it being encrypted. These attacks known as traffic analysis attacks and identify user
behavior based on traffic properties such as bandwidth, packet sizes, inter-packet arrival
time and total time for data transfer. These aforementioned attacks deter or may deter appli-
cations from using compression for data being transferred over the network. Despite it being
a safer option, it decreases the efficiency of data transfer, with effects more pronounced in
low bandwidth networks. In this work, we try to improve the security-efficiency trade-off
in the implementation of a VPN. To boost efficiency, we compress within the VPN so that
the data might be available sooner at either end. Following compression, we use a padding
scheme for traffic to hide user behavior, which attempts to maintain a fixed throughput
irrespective of the compressibility of the data being sent or whether the user is active or
idle. The VPN was tested using various data sets. 100 MBs each of Google, Facebook and
YouTube data, which represent different degrees of compressibility of data (from most to
least compressible). With compression enabled Google, Facebook and YouTube data trans-
ferred in 39%, 70.6% and 94.4% of the time it took to send it with compression disabled
respectively, while maintaining a consistent throughput of approximately 6.3 megabits/sec-
ond. These results clearly show that even with a fixed throughput, data transmission is more
iii
efficient with compression enabled. The changes made in order to mitigate TA attacks led
to improvement in overall traffic characteristics by hiding more information than before but
still reveal some information.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Data Compression
Data compression is the process of reducing the bytes required to transmit or store data.
This can be done in one of the two general ways, namely:
1. Lossy Compression: In this method of compression some data is lost and cannot be
retrieved after decompressing. The loss is justified as only the less critical data is
lost. For example, finer details of an image or audio that might not be significant
enough to noticed or perceived by a human, such as a slightly lower resolution over
a narrower frequency than the original[1].
2. Lossless Compression: In this method of compression, no data is lost in the pro-
cess and the data after decompression is identical to the original data that was com-
pressed. An important limitation of lossless compression is that it is not universal,
which means that it cannot reduce the size of all input data, only certain inputs. Al-
gorithms leverage redundancy within the data, which they reduce using an encoding
scheme. Thus the more random it is (i.e. less redundant) the less it will compress. On
the other hand, it will compress a highly redundant file like a dataset with repeating
numbers into a very small compressed file. Because our work requires perfect de-
compression, we use Lossless compression algorithms and hence we will not discuss
lossy compression further in this work.
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DEFLATE[2] is a lossless compression algorithm that is a combination of the LZ77[3]
algorithm and Huffman coding[4]. In this algorithm, duplicate strings in the data are re-
placed by the "pointers" to their previous occurrences. Pointers are composed of length
and offset information; DEFLATE uses Huffman coding to encode them. Thus, this algo-
rithm adds its own metadata while compressing and if the data is not compressible at all, the
compressed data might have a larger size than the uncompressed data due to the addition of
metadata. Gzip is a popular compression scheme that uses DEFLATE.
Compression is useful for more than just saving space in persistent storage, it is also used
when transferring data across networks. Network bandwidths and computational power are
higher than ever before. With these resources Internet applications and content are moving
towards data centers and the cloud, where people have remote access to these hardware
and software resources. If anything, this has made compression more important than ever.
Not only is it useful while storing data in the cloud infrastructure but also when data is
transferred from the storage to user's device.
1.1.1 Adaptive Compression
As just described, data compression has become a very integral part of network com-
munication. Compression can save time and bandwidth during communication but only
when the total cost of compressing and sending data is lower than the total cost of sending
it uncompressed. Therefore it is possible that compression degrades the overall perfor-
mance. No single compression method is the optimal method to compress all types of data.
For example, LZO is faster than bzip2 but achieves worse compression. Manually con-
trolled compression choices in real systems may result in suboptimal performance, as they
might not take into consideration all factors and not be as responsive to changes. Adaptive
Compression (AC) systems make these choices dynamically to obtain optimal results. AC
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systems typically use methods to determine or estimate the best compression choice for a
given opportunity. For example the size of the input is a factor, as a larger file has a higher
chance of having redundancies and hence more compressibility.
Datacomp[5] is one such AC tool. It is a local AC system that makes a decision about
compressing the data on the basis of a sampling compressibility estimation algorithm, where
the data streams are sampled to decide their compressibility. It uses a process called byte-
counting to decide if the data should be compressed or not. Bytecounting heuristically
estimates the uniformity of an input's symbols by counting the number of times each sym-
bol appears more than a threshold in a given input. If l is the number of characters in the
input and n is the number of possible symbols (256 for 8-bit bytes), the threshold t is l/n,
or the number of times the character would appear if all characters appeared equally. The
greater number of bytes that are "counted" (i.e., appear more than t times in the input), the
more uniform -- and thus less compressible -- is the input. Bytecounting is computationally
inexpensive in that it requires only a single pass over the input, only one division operation
(to compute t) and can be used on a sample of the input. It has a wide array of compression
algorithms to choose from for different types of data, including "No Compression", which
can be seen as fastest but poorest compression choice. Datacomp was intended to replace
system call functions like read(), write(), send(), and recv(). These functions take an input
and its length and return the number of bytes that they wrote / read / etc. The return value
can always be less than the input size, and it is the caller's responsibility to re-send/receive
the remainder of the data. This behavior doesn't work for a VPN, where the receiving size
must get all of an encapsulated packet or message in order to properly respond (e.g., to
acknowledge the packet). Thus, Minicomp will always either compress the entire input, or
none of the input. But it will never process only part of the input. We wanted a tool that
could be used through a function call on a data buffer from within our VPN so that we could
buffer data and make appropriate modifications to it before compressing it.
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Minicomp is a stripped-down version of Datacomp which simply uses the compress-
ibility estimation to choose between Gzip-1 or no compression. As a result, it has a lower
computational overhead than Datacomp and does not have to go through any learning phase.
1.2 Internet and Security
The birth of the Internet as we know it today took place in the form of Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) , originally designed to allow scientists and
researchers to collaborate through data sharing and access to remote computing resources.
With time this group of collaborators grew and so did the infrastructure. Since the network
was limited in its capabilities and was catering to a very limited collaborative and trust-
ing audience, security was not a great concern. Eventually, the data networks originally
restricted to researchers and government contractors started to be opened for public use.
While the level of trust changed, the technology didn't. Internet users woke up to the no-
tion of security threats when in 1988 The "Morris Worm" exposed the vulnerabilities of the
network and how much damage could be caused if these were not fixed.
In the 1990s, with the birth of the World Wide Web and widespread dial-up access
Internet use increased greatly amongst the general public. With this increase in the number
of users and sensitive information on the web, requirement for security measures was great.
One of the initial defenses put up were firewalls, to provide protection to all the systems on
a given network at the same time. Other defenses include the various antivirus programs
meant to detect malicious code and remove it. With time attacks becamemore sophisticated
and defenses evolved to keep up.
The aforementioned methods did not solve the problem in its entirety as the data on the
Internet was still vulnerable to confidentiality and integrity threats due to modification and
interception while it was on the untrusted public network. The solution to this problem was
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cryptography. Although cryptographic algorithms were known for a long time they were
not widely used over the Internet because the threat of interception was seen as being low
compared to the CPU cost of encryption. With the development of asymmetric encryption,
cryptography became even more of a feasible option in a way. The reason was that even
though asymmetric encryption is computationally more expensive than symmetric ones, it
led to the birth of Public Key Encryption (PKE) infrastructure which forms the backbone of
the security of the Internet today. The integrity and confidentiality needs of the Internet led
to the development of protocols that enable encryption for unencrypted communications,
such as SSL/TLS. The various older protocols like HTTP were updated using SSL/TLS to
incorporate encryption. Encryption was successful in providing data integrity and confi-
dentiality over the network. These advances made the idea of a Virtual Private Network
possible. If the data transmitted over the network could be protected through encryption
from "end-to-end", a private network could be simulated over a public one.
1.2.1 SSL/TLS
The SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocols provide
"end-to-end" encryption; data privacy and integrity between both the parties involved in
a communication over the network. They are designed to run over a reliable connection
protocol like TCP and provide an abstraction similar to a traditional TCP socket. There are
a few differences[6] between the older SSL and the newer TLS namely:
1. The keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm in TLS
replaces the SSL Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. HMAC hashes
are more secure than the MAC algorithm.
2. In TLS it is not necessary to include certificates all the way back to the root Certificate
Authority, instead an intermediary authority can be used.
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3. The key derivation differs.
4. The list of cipher suites differ with TLS having a broader suite.
TLS and SSL provide secure HTTP (HTTPS) where the SSL/TLS connection estab-
lishment precedes the normal HTTP data exchange. SSL/TLS can also be used for other
application level protocols like File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple Mail Transfer Proto-
col (SMTP) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). They are also a basis for
some implementations of Virtual Private Networks (VPN). The fundamental idea behind
VPNs is that if the data transmitted over the network could be protected through encryption
from "end-to-end", a private network could be simulated over a public one.
1.2.2 VPN
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is virtual network that is built upon the existing net-
working infrastructure to simulate a secure, private network over a public network[7]. A
VPN works by establishing a virtual Point-to-Point connection making use of dedicated
connections, encryption and tunneling. There are two common types of VPNs[8]:
1. Remote Access - Also known as Virtual Private Dial-up Network (VPDN), this is a
connection from a user-to-LAN meant to connect to a private network from remote
locations.
2. Site-to-Site - These use dedicated equipments and encryption to connect to multiple
fixed locations over a public network like the Internet.
In order to protect private information VPNs support different secure protocols, one of
which is SSL/TLS.
Tunneling, by itself, does not provide security. If the original packet was merely en-
capsulated inside another protocol, it would be still be vulnerable to interception through
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packet capture if not encrypted. Therefore, the encapsulation process in a VPN typically
also includes encryption. VPNs like OpenVPN also have the option of compression, where
each individual packet can be compressed before encapsulating and encrypting it. It also
includes a rudimentary version of adaptive compression.
The use of compression and encryption over the Internet makes communication more
efficient and secure, but these notions are not without their fair share of problems. With
both techniques being used widely, there came a wave of attacks that try to subvert and
exploit them for gains.
OpenVPN is an open-source SSL/TLS based VPN service. It can provide both point-
to-point and site-to site connections. It can run over either User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) in the transport layer. OpenVPN is of interest to
us because it also has an option of packet compression in its configuration parameters. This
compression can be static or adaptive. The adaptive compression in OpenVPN is a simple
one where it periodically samples the data that it sends out to check the compression effi-
ciency. If the data was already compressed, the efficiency would be low and compression
would be turned off until the next sampling. This is a suboptimal approach for AC as the
check is performed only after a fixed amount of time. This may lead to a poor performance
if the traffic compressibility varies quickly as in the case of websites with different content-
types. Another important thing to note about the compression in OpenVPN is that it is done
on a per-packet basis. So only one packet is compressed at once. This is comparatively
a sub-optimal approach compared to compressing multiple packets at a time, as data in it
would have a higher probability of being more redundant, leading to a better compression
ratio.
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1.2.3 Traffic Analysis Attacks
Traffic Analysis (TA) attacks are inference attacks that involve observing data patterns
over a network to infer information about communication's content. It is naively assumed
that communicating over an encrypted tunnel interface is sufficient to deter any attack on the
data, but even going through encryption does not hide the length and number of plaintexts
being encrypted and sent[9]. This seemingly harmless information enables TA attacks that
can reveal the websites visited and even specific activities over those websites[10, 11, 12,
13].
These attacks leverage varying properties of traffic over the network, and are often clas-
sifiers attempting to identify the sites visited among a list of websites. We name a few such
classifiers and the properties they leverage.
1. Liberatore and Levine (LL) Classifier
2. Herrmann, Wendolsky and Federrath (HWF) Classifier
3. Keystroke analysis and Timing attack on SSH
4. Pachenko, Niessen, Zinnen and Engel (PNZE) Classifier
1.2.4 Side-channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks exploit information leaked from physical components of a crypto-
system, like power consumption, processor usage, timing patterns. With the development
of cryptographic algorithms robust to more traditional forms of cryptanalysis, side-channel
attacks have gained popularity. A classic example is the CIA's "TEMPEST"[14] class of
attacks in which leaky RF signals broadcast from teletype devices could be translated into
keystrokes by an eavesdropper. An attack using the same principle can be traced back to
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World War II. This attack can be executed on a target from miles away, making it even
more dangerous.
In recent years, a new threat of side-channel attacks have emerged that exploit the soft-
ware implementation rather than theoretical vulnerabilities in the cryptographic algorithms.
One class of such attacks are the attacks on combinations of compression and encryption.
Data is always compressed before encryption as encryption randomizes data, which would
make it incompressible. Intuitively, using compression along with encryption would seem
to have no effect or in some cases enhance security of a communication. But this has
been proven wrong through attacks exploiting the problem of information leakage inher-
ent in data compression. A lot can be known about the contents of a sample of data by its
compressibility. By exploiting this flaw in compression, attackers are able to figure out the
language used for communication over a compressed encrypted Skype session[15]using the
varying compressibility amongst languages. A deeper inspection using speech processing
algorithms can even reveal the words being used in the communication.
A side-channel exploiting data-compression algorithms making use of the sizes of input
and output through the compressor is presented by John Kelsey[16]. These attacks exploit
the way in which most compression algorithms work; higher redundancy in data leads to
a better compression. A wide spectrum of attacks ranging from passive to chosen plain-
text attacks were covered and the results were presented, with the chosen plain-text attack
showing a 70% success rate for pseudo-randomly-generated strings compressed using the
Zip DEFLATE compression algorithm. More recently, two proof of concepts have made
compression side-channel attacks in the real world a possibility, we talk about them as they
are the most relevant to our work.
1. CRIME: CRIME is a compression side-channel attack[17] on HTTP requests that
leverages information leak through their compression ratios facilitating the attackers
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to decrypt these requests. Through this they get access to the user's login cookie which
in-turn allows them to hijack user's sessions. Enabling TLS or SPDY compression
is necessary for the attack to take place, so, the browsers implementing them were
vulnerable to this attack.
2. Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext
(BREACH): This attack also targets HTTP traffic like CRIME but instead of requests,
it targets responses. This attack leverages information leakages through compression
ratio of these responses to reveal sensitive information within the responses like the
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token. This attack works against HTTP-level
compression (the most common compression scheme being gzip.), unlike CRIME's
attack on TLS compression.
These attacks on compression have led to applications avoiding compression altogether,
because developers have started seeing compression as a security liability for network com-
munications. For example, TLS compression has been deprecated in the latest versions of
TLS. The problem with this broader approach is that it is not solving the problem but taking
an easier way out of it. This comes at a cost; with compression disabled, there is a loss
of efficiency of data transfer over the Internet. Instead, through algorithmic tweaking of
compression in applications it can be made more secure and our communications can be
both efficient and secure.
1.2.5 Our Work
The work we did in this thesis aims at making compression more secure and hence
no more a liability. In our work we implemented a TCP based VPN that had adaptive
compression built in it for the packets along with a padding scheme. A special feature of
this VPN is that it does not perform packet compression on just each packet alone. Our
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algorithm can collect multiple packets in a buffer and then compress the buffer to get a
better compression ratio, which results in the receiver obtaining the packets earlier than
they would otherwise.
In the VPN, the data compression intended to improve the throughput efficiency, while
padding was included to add length hiding to the compressed packets. After the completion
of these steps, the data would be encrypted to hide the plaintexts and hide the difference
between the padding vs actual data. This method brings to light the efficiency-security
trade-off as the system's efficiency was not as high as it would be with just compression
(without any length hiding) but it was more secure than a compression-only system. One
more security feature in the VPN is that we send junk data at the constant connection band-
width even when there is no actual data being exchanged. This hides if the user is active or
idle. Our implementation of hiding traffic characteristics was not perfect, but is a significant
improvement.
We collected browsing sessions of very popular websites (Google, Facebook, Reddit,
YouTube, Wikipedia) along with some synthetic data types, namely a file with just the
character '0' and a file with random data stream to test the extreme cases of compressibility
of data.
Our experiments consist of a three system setup.
1. A VPN client (Alice)
2. A VPN server (Bob)
3. A Man in the Middle (Eve)
All the data exchanges took place between Alice and Bob with Eve acting as an invisible
network bridge. We transferred data blobs between the server and client using the netcat[18]
tool.
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We measured time taken for transferring the blobs with compression turned on and off.
We also captured the traffic dump at Eve so that we could examine traffic characteristics
used in Traffic Analysis attacks.
The next chapter is Related Work, which talks in detail about the works related to our
thesis. These include tools that we used in our work, and previous works that we get some
of our ideas from and build upon. After that is the Implementation chapter where we discuss
in depth about the details of the VPN we implemented. After that we discuss the results of
the experiments in the Results chapter. In the end we conclude with the Conclusion chapter
by talking about the things we were able to achieve in this work and all the future work that
can be done based on this.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Compression over the Network
With the increase in the amount of data typically sent and current bandwidth limitations,
compression has become an important tool for network communication. Data Compression
reduces the size of the data frames to be sent over a network. This reduction of size reduces
the time required to send this data and conserves the bandwidth consumed by each user.
The compression can take place on different network layers depending on the requirements
of the communication. Two such compression frameworks relevant to our work are :
1. TLS compression - TLS included an option to select a lossless data compression
method as a part of the TLS Handshake Protocol and this algorithm was then ap-
plied as a part of TLS Record Protocol. Compression methods with the ability to
maintain state/history information in order to achieve a better compression may also
be used as TLS along with the protocols in the lower layers ensure reliable and se-
quenced packet delivery. Hence both, per packet compression and compression over
multiple packets are allowed.
2. HTTP compression - Built into web servers and web clients (as part of the HTTP stan-
dard), HTTP compression helps to increase bandwidth utilization. Using it, HTTP
responses are compressed before being sent from the server to the client or vice
versa. Browsers negotiate the compression method before the compression takes
place, and browsers not supporting compression download uncompressed data. The
13
most common compression methods supported are DEFLATE and gzip (which uses
DEFLATE). Compression can take place in two different ways. At a lower level, a
Transfer-Encoding header field indicates that the payload of the HTTP message is
compressed. At a higher level, a Content-Encoding header field indicates that a re-
source being transferred is compressed. Obviously, HTTP compression only works
for HTTP traffic, however other protocols (such as SSH) include compression.
2.2 Adaptive Compression Tools
The notion of Adaptive Compression (AC) has been introduced in the previous chapter.
In the process of our work we researched a few AC tools. These were instrumental in
providing important insights that led us to the tool that we designed and finally used in our
work. We talk about two such important tools.
2.2.1 ACCENT
Adaptive Cryptography Plugged Compression Network (ACCENT)[19] was designed
for SSL/TLS-based cloud services. These cloud services includemobile offices,Web-based
storage services, and content delivery services. These run workloads under various device
platforms, networks and cloud service providers. ACCENT solves three mismatches per-
taining to the emerging cloud services running on top of SSL/TLS. The first being the perfor-
mance of loosely coupled encryption and communication routines that lead to underutilized
computation and communication resources. Second, the conventional SSL/TLS provides
no AC, but only a static compression mode. Third, there is a memory allocation overhead
due to frequent compression switching in SSL/TLS. To solve these issues, ACCENT uses
the following three mechanisms:
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1. Tightly-coupled threaded SSL/TLS coding (TTSC): TTSC maximizes the bandwidth
and processing power used in the process of SSL/TLS sending and receiving data.
Through tight coupling, they avoid various blocking and wake-up operations that
would otherwise be encountered leading to a sub-optimal resource utilization.
2. Floating scale-based adaptive compression negotiation (FSCN): FSCN is ACCENT's
adaptive compression mechanism. It involves floating scales (dynamic parameters)
of the sender and receiver that vary dynamically according to the compression and
encryption data rate and the compression ratio.
3. Unified memory allocation for seamless compression switching (UMAC): UMAC
minimizes the overhead associated with switching compression algorithms by unify-
ing their memory footprints by automatically transforming memory layouts.
Though ACCENT came pretty close to the adaptive compression algorithm we might
have used, we could not use it as it did the compression in the SSL/TLS layer and we needed
to perform compression within our VPNwhich would have come after that. Another reason
for not using ACCENT was that it had compression buffer and dictionary ranging from
16KB to 453.3KB. We wanted the compression buffer size to be a configurable parameter
in our VPN. There was also no length hiding in ACCENT by default. Length hiding could
have been added but that would have changed the TTSC mechanism entirely, which would
have degraded ACCENT's performance.
2.2.2 Datacomp
Datacomp monitors four environmental properties for its adaptive compression mecha-
nism that decides whether to compress the data or not and which compression algorithm to
utilize: CPU Utilization, CPU frequency, data type and available bandwidth. The number
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of different combinations of the values of these factors can be very large; to cope with this
Datacomp quantizes these values to reduce the set of combinations to a manageable num-
ber. To evaluate the performance of Datacomp, it is compared to the performance results
of Comptool, which is an Adaptive Compression Oracle that can empirically determine the
best compression strategy for a given scenario. The results show that in the range of 1-100
Mbit/s and a range of realistic data types, Datacomp's strategy produced results statistically
similar to the best-case result or extremely close to it. However it fails to break even at
one Gbit/s as the cost of computation for computation and adaptation is much higher than
sending the data uncompressed over the high bandwidth network.
We didn't use Datacomp proper in part because it had a time consuming learning phase,
which was not desired in our VPN. The main factor though, was that Datacomp performed
compression within a system call, but as stated above we needed it to be done within our
VPN itself. Therefore the adaptive compression method we ended up using was the brand
new Minicomp which is a simplified Datacomp with fewer features but less overhead and
developer burden.
2.3 Traffic Analysis Attacks
We introduced TA attacks in the previous chapter. These attacks demonstrate the fact
that encryption is not the "silver bullet" for privacy. Even with the seemingly invincible tool
of encryption, more sophisticated attacks can be mounted that reveal user behavior over the
Internet. A few such attacks are described below
2.3.1 Liberatore and Levine (LL) Classifier
This classifier[20] attempted to identify, using aNaive Bayes (NB) classifier with packet
lengths and directions as features, which one of a set of web pages was visited. In their
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work, Liberatore and Levine built two different systems, a naive Bayes classifier and one
based upon Jaccard's coefficient (a similarity metric). They calculated the probabilities of
the traffic belonging to a particular website. They had a list of 2,000 websites in total and
they used a varying number of websites from the list in the experiments and assigned them
labels. The classification was done based on the vectors of the features being used, which
in their case were obtained from the count of the packet lengths sent in each direction. The
label with the highest probability was selected as the guess of each system.
The naive Bayes classifier had an accuracy of 86.2% and the Jaccard's coefficient clas-
sifier had an accuracy of 88.9%. The classifiers worked for the traffic both before and after
encryption.
2.3.2 Herrmann, Wendolsky and Federrath (HWF) Classifier
This classifier[21] uses a Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB) classifier for traffic identi-
fication. MNB in this case estimated the probability of the traffic belonging to a website
based on the aggregated frequency of the features over all the vectors. The system used
normalized counts of the direction and length of the packets. Their list of websites were the
775 most visited domain names between January 2007 and September 2007.
Their classifier had an accuracy of approximately 97%.
2.3.3 Keystroke analysis and Timing attack on SSH
This exploit[22] uses Hidden Markov Models (HMM) constructed upon the keystrokes.
In this attack the authors showed how a simple statistical analysis revealed sensitive infor-
mation like the length of the user's passwords. With slightly more sophisticated analysis
on timing information, they were able to learn about what the users were typing in SSH
sessions.
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The typing patternswere studied by developing aHiddenMarkovModel (HMM) through
which they could predict key sequences using the inter-keystroke timings. They further
developed a system named Herbivore, which reduced the time taken to brute force user
passwords by a factor of 50 just by collecting timing information on the network.
2.3.4 Pachenko, Niessen, Zinnen and Engel (PNZE) Classifier
Low-latency anonymization networks like Tor are considered to be one of the safest
channels of communications for ordinary citizens to maintain their anonymity over the In-
ternet. The PNZE classifier showed how the security in such networks is not perfect with
some glaring flaws as they fail to resist website fingerprinting attacks.
For the classification the authors used a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier with
features including packet lengths, ordering, total number of packets transmitted, total num-
ber of bytes transmitted and proportion of packets in either direction. Their classifier had
an accuracy of 55%.
2.3.5 Countermeasure: Buffered Fixed-Length Obfuscator (BuFLO)
In their work[9], Dyer et.al work on a countermeasure to the aforementioned classifiers.
It was designed to send fixed-length packets at a constant interval for a fixed amount of time
although traffic is allowed to go over that fixed time limit, still with the fixed-length packets
and fixed intervals.
BuFlO is governed by three integer parameters d,  and  where:
1. d determines the size of the fixed-length packets.
2.  determines the rate (in milliseconds) at which the packets are sent.
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3.  determines the minimum amount of time (in milliseconds) for which the packets
are sent.
Therefore it will send a packet of length d every milliseconds until the communication
is over or  seconds have passed, whichever is greater. When there is no data in a buffer,
dummy data is sent.
BuFLO was evaluated empirically with parameters in the ranges of  2 0, 10000, 
2 20, 40 and d 2 1000, 1500. The least bandwidth-intensive experimental configuration
was with  = 0,  = 40 and d = 1000. In this case the average accuracy of their classifier
was 27.3%, compared to a 97.5% average accuracy without any countermeasure. The most
bandwidth-intensive experimental configuration was with  = 10000,  = 20 and d = 1500.
The accuracy here was 5.1%.
Through experiments they determined that BuFLO still leaked the total bytes transmitted
and the time required to transmit a data set in a couple of cases:
1. The data source continued producing data for more than  time.
2. The data is not produced beyond  , but there is still data left in the buffer at time  .
2.4 Compression side-channel Attacks
As their name suggests, compression side-channel attacks are a special class of side-
channel attacks that rely on information leaked though the compression ratios of different
input. We talk in detail about the two such the mitigation of which were the main focus of
this thesis as we worked to mitigate them.
19
2.4.1 CRIME
In the year 2012 Rizzo and Duong revealed an attack on HTTPS called CRIME. This
attack could be used to recover headers of an HTTP request mainly targeting the secret key
in the authentication cookie. CRIME works only when the browser and server both support
TLS compression or SPDY, an open networking protocol used by Google and Twitter.
In a CRIME attack, the compressed and encrypted message is combined with JavaScript
controlled by the attacker to perform a letter by letter brute-force attack on the secret key.
Once the first character is guessed correctly, this process is repeated again on the next
character in the key until the remainder of the secret is deduced. In order to mitigate this
attack TLS compression and SPDY need to be disabled on the browsers and the servers.
Consequently major browsers that previously supported TLS compression and SPDY re-
leased patches to disable the vulnerable features.
2.4.2 BREACH
Another attack named BREACH was revealed a year later which was built off the
CRIME attack. This attack does not rely on TLS compression but instead leverages com-
mon HTTP compression mechanisms such as Gzip and DEFLATE.
BREACH attack targets HTTP responses instead of HTTP requests. It is very common
to use Gzip at the HTTP level, even if TLS-level compression is disabled. Secret strings
such as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) tokens are included in the same HTTP response
as the user input and are compressed in the same compression context. DEFLATE (the basis
for Gzip) shrinks the payload by taking advantage of the repeated strings, thus an attacker
can use the URL parameters in the response to guess some token, one character at a time.
Suppose request and response contains a string like 'canary='. In this case the value after
canary is a CSRF token. In this attack the guess value is inserted like 'canary=<guess>'
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so the 'canary=' string is repeated and if the first character of the guess matches the first
character of the actual token the DEFLATE would compress the body even more. In this
way the attacker proceeds to recover the secret token byte-by-byte. In the experiment by the
developers of BREACH they could recover the CSRF token for Microsoft's Outlook Web
Access with an accuracy of approximately 95%, and often within 30 seconds[23]. This
attack is facilitated if the response remains mostly the same except for the attacker's guess,
as the difference in size of the response is normally very small (on the order of bytes) and
hence is susceptible to noise. This attack can work against any cipher suite, but the attack
is simpler if a stream cipher is used as the difference in sizes between responses is more
granular.
The attacker's ability to view the victim's encrypted traffic requires some kind of Man
in the Middle access and could be achieved through ARP spoofing. The attacker must
also be able to make the victim send HTTP requests to the vulnerable web server. This is
accomplished by making the victim visit a site controlled by the attacker that contains an
invisible Iframe pointing to the vulnerable server. This is an active, online attack and so the
attacker makes the victim send a small number of requests continuously in order to guess
the password byte-by-byte.
A few mitigations for this attack are:
1. Hiding the length by inserting random garbage value as padding, but this only in-
creases the complexity by a factor of O(
p
n)[24]. Here n is the number of padding
bytes added.
2. Putting secret values in a completely different compression context than that of the
user input, but this requires special, uncommon software.
3. Disabling HTTP compression, but this hurts efficiency.
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4. Limiting and monitoring the HTTP request-rate.
As it is evident by this section, our work in this thesis combines the network primitives
like compression and encryption in a way that strives to be both efficient and secure. Our
VPN tries to make the data resistant to compression side-channel and TA attacks by adding
length hiding and manipulating the data stream. The resources we mentioned above played
a vital role in shaping this work into its current form.
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3 Implementation
The experimental setup primarily includes three systems: Alice, Eve and Bob. All
the three devices are on the same Local Area Network (LAN) with Internet access. The
interface of interest to us is the one between Alice-Eve and Eve-Bob. In this setup Eve
acts as an Ethernet bridge between Alice and Bob. This setup aims at simulating a real life
scenario where Bob is one of the servers on campus of a company and Alice is the PC client
of an off-site employee connected to Bob through a VPN.
Eve is a silent interceptor in this connection, which we use to monitor and analyze the
traffic between the server and client. All the VPN traffic flows through this connection. It
acts as a Ethernet bridge between the server and the client, which technically is a Man in the
Middle. It is used to collect network traffic information between the client and the server
as the bridge in this case represents how the data traffic would be on the wire in between
the client and the server.
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Figure 3.1: The Physical Experimental Setup
24
3.1 Hardware Setup
Eve is a HP Compaq 6005 pro PC with AMD Phenom II X2 B55 Dual Core Processor.
Bob is HP Elite 7100 MT with Intel Core i3 530 Dual Core Processor. The RAM for both
these systems is 4 gigabytes and have gigabit network interface cards. Alice is a Dell XPS
13 Ultrabook Intel Core i5-6200U Quad Core Processor with 8 gigabytes of RAM and
867Mbit network interface card. All the systems run Ubuntu 14.04LTS.
Figure 3.2: The Logical Experimental Setup
3.2 VPN
The first step in the implementation process was to set up a functioning VPN between
two systems. The VPN needed to be open source since we intended to modify it to include
our own algorithm in it. OpenVPN was considered at the beginning but making changes to
it was too complicated, so we decided to go for a simple "bare bones" VPN as it would not
affect he value of this research. We found an existing project on GitHub called S-VPN[25]
that matched our requirements. S-VPN is a UDP-based VPN. For encryption, S-VPN uses
a simple substitution cipher algorithm. It has no built-in compression functionality.
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3.3 Packet Buffering
The first step was to add the capability to buffer multiple packets as it would mean more
context for compression hence leading to better data compressibility. The size of the buffer
was a configurable parameter. In case the number of packets available were not enough to
fill the buffer, there was a configurable timeout parameter. This ensured the accumulated
packets would be sent out after a fixed time even if the packets did not fully fill the buffer.
Before adding each packet to the buffer, a 32-bit header containing the packet length was
added to each packet. This information was needed at the receiving ends, as the packets
had to be written to the tunnel interface individually. The first packet of the entire buffer
had an additional 64-bit header that had the total length of the accumulated packets in the
buffer and the padding (which is discussed in a later section). This header information was
critical as it gave the receiving end the needed information for reassembling the buffer as
the entire buffer might not be sent out as one chunk (it may need to be broken into smaller
packets to be sent over the wire).
Since this 'beacon packet' had to be the first packet to be read at the other end before
the remaining buffer, it was important for the packets not to be out of order. We could not
ensure this with UDP because it is not a reliable protocol. So, we switched to TCP instead,
because it is a reliable protocol ensuring that packet order is maintained. This order was
also important as once we started using compression, because if any piece of the compressed
buffer was out of order during reassembly, the decompression at the other end would have
given an inconsistent result.
We used a fixed length buffer of 63,712 bytes. A bigger buffer of one or two megabytes
was tested too, but it took too long to accumulate and compress that many packets. More-
over, the buffer wouldn't get full because of the TCP window-size constraint (where TCP
only allows a given number of packets to be sent over the wire before getting an acknowl-
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edgment for the receipt of a packet from the receiving end). Additionally, we weren't mak-
ing use of the bandwidth optimally, as there was a longer idle time for any data to be put
on the wire. We tried a few buffer sizes and 63,712 bytes gave the best performance out of
those. 63,712 seems like an odd number to choose, but it was done because Ethernet allows
a maximum segment size (MSS) of 1514 bytes out of which 1448 bytes is the payload and
the remaining 66 bytes are the headers. For length hiding, we needed to only send packets
of a fixed length. Since the buffer size is a multiple of 1448, this ensured that when it was
fragmented into individual packets and sent, they would all be of equal sizes.
3.4 Compression
Once the buffering was working, we added the compression functionality to the VPN.
In order to add compression, we used a tool named Minicomp. As mentioned before, this
was a watered-down Datacomp. Essentially, works similarly to the memcpy() call in C, but
instead of simply copying a buffer from one location to another, it adaptively compresses
the source buffer and copied it to the destination buffer.
Minicomp added its own 32-bit header to the buffer. The header had the following
information in it:
1. a magic number
2. Whether the buffer was compressed
3. The uncompressed size of the buffer
4. The compressed size of the buffer.
Minicomp chose between two options, either to compress the buffer using Gzip-1 or not
to compress at all.
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3.5 Padding Scheme
After compression, we added a padding scheme to our VPN. For padding, we filled the
buffer with the '0' bit. Any other character or group of characters could have been used
without making a difference to our implementation as the padding was simply ignored on
the receiving side. We tried a few different padding schemes to go along with the buffering
and compression algorithms:
1. Initially, we tried filling the buffer with packets, compressing them, filling the re-
maining length of the 63,712-byte buffer with padding and sending it to the other
end. Unfortunately, this didn't give our VPN much of a performance boost compared
to the uncompressed buffered packets, as even though compression reduced the size
of the buffered packets (as a result of which the valid data reached the other end
faster), a lot of padding was being sent along with it that had to be ignored. Hence,
this approach was not using the bandwidth efficiently.
2. Next, we tried going through multiple iterations of filling the buffer with packets and
compressing. In this approach, after compressing the filled buffer once, we filled the
remaining length of the buffer with packets again and compressing them. This was
done until there were no more packets to be read from the application and we had a
timeout, or the buffer was full. In case of a timeout, the remaining empty buffer was
filled with padding. This approach also gave a sub-optimal performance, as the mul-
tiple iterations of reading packets from the application and filling them in the buffer
was too costly. The TCP window-size only allowed approximately 80 kilobytes of
packets to be read, which was too little to fill the buffer after being compressed. This
caused the VPN to sit idle waiting for the timeout to occur. With this extra time spent
idle waiting for a timeout and the time spent compressing, this version performed
worse than when uncompressed data was being sent out.
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3. In the scheme that currently use, the buffer is filled with packets and compressed
once. Then if the new size of the compressed buffer was not a multiple of 1448,
we just added minimum amount of padding to make it a multiple. Due to this, the
header format for the beacon packet was 64 bits long, where the the first 32 bits were
the length of the compressed valid data and the other 32 bits were the length of the
padding added. This information was needed as the total buffer size that was frag-
mented and sent was not constant. This method was chosen as it gave a much better
performance when compared to uncompressed data while still keeping the packet
sizes constant.
Figure 3.3: The padding Scheme: The figure shows the uncompressed buffer being com-
pressed and padded before going on the wire. Note that the size of the buffer being sent is
different from the uncompressed one.
It should be noted that the experimental setup had a high bandwidth of about 200Mbit-
s/sec. At this bandwidth, compression starts losing it's advantage of being faster than un-
compressed data because of the compression throughput of the CPU. Since our VPN is more
appropriate for lower bandwidth connections (like mobile networks and Internet in devel-
oping nations), we artificially reduced our bandwidth to 6Mbits/sec. All the experiments
were performed at this bandwidth.
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3.6 Idle-time filling
An important feature that we added to our VPN was idle-time filling; we sent out junk
data when the network would have otherwise been idle. The intention of this was to have
a constant bandwidth of traffic over the network so as to hide Alice's usage pattern from
any eavesdropper. We used 2,896 bytes of buffers filled with the character '0' as the junk
data. This buffer was sent out whenever there was nothing to read on the interface from the
application or from the other side. The size of junk buffer was smaller when compared to
the buffer for valid data, as we didn't want the VPN to wait for sending out a large buffer
if there was actual data ready to be read from an interface in the middle of the process of
sending out junk data. The junk data was appropriately timed so as to imitate the bandwidth
behavior of the valid data.
3.7 Experiments
For testing our VPN, we used seven different datasets:
1. a file with a string of zeros in it (Zero String) from /dev/zero/
2. a file with a string of random characters in it (Random Data) from /dev/urandom
3. a trace file with data from browsing Google
4. a trace file with data from browsing YouTube
5. a trace file with data from browsing Reddit
6. a trace file with data from browsing Wikipedia
7. a trace file with data from browsing Facebook
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All the traces were 100 megabytes each and were created by capturing browsing ses-
sions on thewebsitesmentioned above. This was done through theNetworkMonitor feature
in Mozilla Firefox[26] browser, which allows capturing uncompressed and unencrypted
browsing sessions. Another significance of these files is the different degrees of compress-
ibility of each. The table below highlights these differences.
File Name Compressed Size (MB) Compression ratio
Random Data 100.01 1.000
YouTube 93.68 0.937
Facebook 68.07 0.680
Wikipedia 48.05 0.480
Reddit 47.31 0.473
Google 36.38 0.364
Zero String 0.43 0.004
Table 3.1: Compressed file sizes and compression ratios for the different datasets when
compressed using Gzip-1
For the experiments these files were transferred from the client to server using Net-
cat[27] in the TCP mode. This was repeated for every file 15 times with adaptive com-
pression on and 15 times with all compression off. Each file transfer was preceded and
followed by 20 seconds of idle-time filling traffic. The network traffic was captured at the
bridge interface (Eve) between the client and the server using Tcpdump[28].
In the next section we present the various traffic characteristics from these experiments.
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4 Results
4.1 Data transfer times
One of the main goals of this thesis was to incorporate compression in the VPN to
achieve lower data transfer times when compared with a VPN without compression. As
mentioned in the previous section we ran 15 tests each with compression on and off for
all seven datasets. The comparisons between total time taken for each dataset to transfer
through the VPN, (with compression on and off) are presented below.
Figure 4.1: Time taken to transfer the Random Data dataset with compression on vs. off
We notice that the transfer times with both compression on and off were almost equal
for the Random Data dataset and was very close in case of YouTube. The reason for this
is the incompressibility of the datasets. In these cases Minicomp correctly chose to not
compress the data. Facebook, although not the most compressible datasets, did benefit
from compression with an average transfer time of 103.98s compared to 147.01s without
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Figure 4.2: Time taken to transfer the YouTube dataset with compression on vs. off
Figure 4.3: Time taken to transfer the Fb dataset with compression on vs. off
Figure 4.4: Time taken to transfer the Wikipedia dataset with compression on vs. off
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Figure 4.5: Time taken to transfer the Reddit data dataset with compression on vs. off
Figure 4.6: Time taken to transfer the Google dataset with compression on vs. off
Figure 4.7: Time taken to transfer the Zero String dataset with compression on vs. off
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File Name Without com-
pression (s)
With compres-
sion (s)
Absolute time
difference (s)
Percentage
time difference
Random Data 146.57 146.33 0.24 0.16
YouTube 147.13 138.37 8.76 5.95
Facebook 147.01 103.98 29.27 19.91
Wikipedia 147.02 75 72.02 48.98
Reddit 147.01 73.81 73.2 49.79
Google 146.95 57.36 89.59 60.96
Zero String 146.63 13.97 132.66 90.47
Table 4.1: Transfer time for all datasets with compression vs. without compression.
compression, an improvement of 19.91% . Wikipedia with and Reddit datasets took almost
half the average time, with compression enabled; Wikipedia and Reddit took on an average
of 75s and 73.81s with compression on and, 147.02s and 147.01s with compression off
respectively, an improvement of 48.98% and 49.79% respectively.
The Google dataset is even more compressible had an even better performance with an
average time of 57.36s with compression on and 146.95s with it off, an improvement of
60.96%. Obviously, the best performance was with the Zero String data with an average
time of 13.97s with compression on and 146.63s with it off, an improvement of 90.47%—
an improvement of more than ten times in the transfer time.
The remaining results presented in this section are only for the VPN with compression
and idle-time filling features, since these results can be evaluated independently, and don't
actually need a comparison with traffic characteristics of the VPN without these additional
features (as hiding traffic characteristics is not expected of it).
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4.2 IO Graphs
In order to hide the traffic characteristics in our VPN, we used idle-time filling; the idea
was to maintain a constant data flow rate in case of both valid data and idle-time filling. Pre-
sented below are IO graphs from one representative experiment for each dataset (averages
over multiple experiments are not helpful because they would normalize subtle patterns in
the graphs, which would depict a lesser information leak than actually occurs).
Figure 4.8: IO Graphs for Random Data dataset in B/s
Figure 4.9: IO Graphs for YouTube dataset in B/s
Figure 4.10: IO Graphs for Fb dataset in B/s
The IO graphs were generated using Wireshark[29] on packets captured by Tcpdump.
In this capture process, the first and last 20 seconds in each capture is the only idle-time
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Figure 4.11: IO Graphs for Wikipedia dataset in B/s
Figure 4.12: IO Graphs for Reddit dataset in B/s
Figure 4.13: IO Graphs for Google dataset in B/s
Figure 4.14: IO Graphs for Zero String dataset in B/s
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filling and the duration in between is the datasets being transferred. This was done in order
to compare the traffic characteristics of idle-time filling to actual dataset transfer.
For all datasets except Zero String, the IO graph seems to be nearly identical for both
idle-time filling and dataset transfer. Although there is a momentary spike seen at the be-
ginning of dataset transfer, it is an artifact of our bandwidth limitation and not because of
the VPN. The reason for it is that we artificially create a network bandwidth of 6Mbits/s by
limiting it in the tunnel, but in case of a sudden surge in data traffic it takes a few seconds
to adjust to it and bring the bandwidth back to the set value. This would not be a concern
in a network with an actual bandwidth limit.
The IO graph for Zero String dataset is an exception. In this case, the data transfer rate
actually drops below the data transfer rate of the time filling traffic. The reason for this is
that even though the time spent buffering and compressing the data stays the same as in the
case of the other datasets, the data compresses to a negligible size. So, in the same time
window, a very small amount of data is actually being transferred, thus reducing the bytes
transferred per second. As a result, traffic hiding isn't effective for this dataset. We will
discuss a potential approach for solving this problem in the conclusion.
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4.3 Packet size statistics
The variation in packet sizes within a data stream reveals information about the data
being transferred. It is used as a feature by many of the traffic analysis attacks we discussed
to classify network traffic into specific websites visited. As mentioned in the previous
section, our VPN uses a padding scheme that keeps the packet sizes constant, with a value
of 1514 bytes. The other packets in the stream are the TCP acknowledgment packets and
TCP window size update packets. We present the packet size statistics from one of the
representative experiments for each dataset.
Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 44179 66.01 66 78 31.75
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 94973 1514 1514 1514 68.25
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.2: Packet Length Statistics for Random Data dataset
Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 41927 66.01 66 78 31.65
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 90526 1514 1514 1514 68.35
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.3: Packet Length Statistics for YouTube dataset
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Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 32539 66.02 66 78 30.59
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 73827 1514 1514 1514 69.41
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.4: Packet Length Statistics for Fb dataset
Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 25668 66.02 66 78 30.30
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 59051 1514 1514 1514 69.70
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.5: Packet Length Statistics for Wikipedia dataset
It is apparent from the tables that there are packets in only two of the size ranges, namely
40-79 and 1280-2559 bytes. The minimum packet size for the former range is 66 bytes,
which represents the TCP acknowledgment packets that, as their name suggests acknowl-
edge the receipt of a packet. These packets dominate their size range as suggested by the
average packet size for this range. The maximum packet size and the only other packet size
in this range is 78 bytes. These packets are TCP window update packets that indicate that
the sender's TCP receive buffer size has increased.
The second and the only other packet range with a non-zero packet count i.e. the 1280-
2559 bytes have just a single packet size as the minimum and maximum packet sizes for
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Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 25498 66.02 66 78 30.24
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 58828 1514 1514 1514 69.76
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.6: Packet Length Statistics for Reddit dataset
Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 20812 66.03 66 78 29.15
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 50582 1514 1514 1514 70.85
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.7: Packet Length Statistics for Google dataset
this range is the same. These packets are the packets containing the data sent by the VPN,
including both the valid and idle-time filling data. Another thing to notice from these tables
is how the compressibility of data in a file is related to the number of packets sent in each
experiment. The total number of packets in an experiment are maximum for the Random
Data dataset and minimum for Zero String dataset.
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Packet Lengths (B) Count Average Min. value Max. value Percent
0-19 0 - - - 0.00
20-39 0 - - - 0.00
40-79 9055 66.22 66 78 27.38
80-159 0 - - - 0.00
160-319 0 - - - 0.00
320-639 0 - - - 0.00
640-1279 0 - - - 0.00
1280-2559 24014 1514 1514 1514 72.62
2560-5119 0 - - - 0.00
Table 4.8: Packet Length Statistics for Zero String dataset
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4.4 Inter-Packet Arrival Times
Inter-packet arrival time is the time elapsed between arrival of two consecutive packets.
This information can be used in a TA attack as it reveals user activity and possibly the type
of website being visited. We present the graphs of the inter-packet arrival times vs time
elapsed from one of the representative experiments for each dataset.
Figure 4.15: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Random Data dataset.
In these graphs, idle-time filling at the beginning and the end are clearly distinguishable
from the valid data transfer in the middle. The VPN wasn't successful in hiding this infor-
mation. The reason for this is that in order to keep a constant flow rate of data, the timing
of idle-time filling data was altered to imitate the behavior of valid data. This approach did
give a constant flow rate, but leaked information through the inter-packet arrival times.
43
Figure 4.16: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for YouTube dataset
Another important thing to notice in these graphs is how the Zero String dataset behaves
differently than all the other six datasets. The reason for this is that since the Zero String
dataset was highly compressible, the entire buffer of packets compressed into a a size less
than that of a single packet. Thus with the time taken for buffering and compressing the
packets staying almost the same, there was just one packet being sent over the network in
this case, unlike the other datasets where there was a stream of multiple packets.
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Figure 4.17: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Fb dataset
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Figure 4.18: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Wikipedia dataset
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Figure 4.19: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Reddit dataset
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Figure 4.20: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Google dataset
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Figure 4.21: Inter-packet arrival times vs. time for Zero String dataset
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5 Conclusions
Data Compression has a great potential for increasing efficiency of communication over
the Internet. Its importance increases significantly for networks with a lower bandwidth.
In the earlier days, this compression process was a static one; where the compressing ap-
plication would try to compress all the data going through it, regardless of the fact that it
was compressible or not. Then the concept of adaptive compression was introduced, which
dynamically made the decision of compressing the data or not, based on its compressibility.
This made the whole process of compression even more efficient, compared to just static
compression.
Compression comes with its fair share of challenges though, as information leakage
through compression ratio was employed by cyber attacks called compression side-channel
attacks. BREACH is one such attack that targeted HTTPS responses by leveraging the
information leakage through compression ratio of encrypted responses to reveal sensitive
information within them, such as the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token. This attack
works against HTTP-level compression. Even the encryption provided through SSL/TLS
didn't make the traffic immune to such attacks. As a result, compression is often seen as a
security liability, and is being avoided in applications despite its advantages. In addition to
compression side-channel attacks, there exist another form of attacks called Traffic Analysis
(TA) attacks that, based on the traffic properties like packet sizes, inter-packet arrival times
and bandwidth usage, can identify insights about the websites visited, type of data being
accessed on the website and the user usage patterns.
In our work, we developed a TCP based Virtual Private Network (VPN) application
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that uses compression to enhance its efficiency while also trying to mitigate the compres-
sion side-channel and TA attacks. The VPN has a unique way of compressing data where
it does not perform per-packet compression but rather buffers packets and then compresses
them. Compressing a buffer of packets achieves a higher compression ratio than per-packet
compression as the buffer provides more compression context thus increasing the compress-
ibility. We use fixed buffer with a length of 63,712 bytes to buffer the packets. Each packet
in the buffer is preceded by a 4 byte header containing its length information.
Once the buffer is full of packets, we compress the packets using a lightweight adaptive
compression tool called Minicomp. Minicomp makes the decision to compress the data or
not, based on a process called bytecounting. If the decision is to compress, the data is com-
pressed using Gzip-1, and a 32-bit header is added to the data. The API call to Minicomp
was similar to memcpy(), where the difference was that the data was also compressed in
addition to being copied to a new location.
In addition to compression, a padding scheme is also used in this VPN. This padding
scheme hides the packet size information by padding the buffer after compression in such a
way that when the buffer is fragmented into individual packets and sent over the network,
all the packets are of the same size. This size in our case is the maximum segment size of
packet payload over Ethernet, which is 1448 bytes. When padding is added to the buffer,
there is a 8-bit header added at the front of the buffer that contains the length of the valid
data and the padding in the buffer.
An additional capability of idle-time filling is also included in theVPN. Since bandwidth
usage analysis is one of the techniques employed by TA attacks, we tried to hide bandwidth
utilization by sending junk data when there was no actual data being transferred. This junk
data was timed to imitate the behavior of actual data being transferred.
Experiments were conducted between a server and client, with a bridge interface in
the middle to gather information about the traffic between them. We used seven different
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datasets, each 100 megabytes in size, that were transferred between the server and client
through the VPN using netcat. Out of the seven datasets, five were data dumps from brows-
ing popular websites namely, Google, Facebook, Reddit, Wikipedia and YouTube. The
remaining two datasets were a text file full of random data (Random Data) and a string of
zeros (Zero String). All these datasets had varying compressibilities, with the random data
dataset being the least compressible and the zero string dataset being the most compressible.
The network bandwidth was artificially lowered to 6Mbits/s to simulate low bandwidth con-
nections. Twenty seconds before a file transfer was initiated and twenty seconds after the
file transfer concluded, idle-time filling traffic was sent, in order to compare its behavior to
the valid data transfer.
The first set of results we presented was the time taken to transfer each dataset with
compression on and off. The minimum difference in transfer times with adaptive compres-
sion on and off was for the Random Data dataset and the maximum difference was for Zero
String dataset. For the Random Data dataset, it took an average time of 146.33 seconds to
transfer with compression on and 146.57 seconds with compression off, which should be
considered to be equal. The minuscule difference in this case is not an improvement, but
rather, noise introduced due to the random nature of network communications. For the Zero
String dataset, it took an average time of 13.97 seconds to transfer with compression on and
146.63 seconds with compression off, an improvement of 90.47%. The time differences for
the other datasets were within this range. Wikipedia had the median time difference, with
75 seconds with compression on and 147.02 seconds with compression off, an improvement
of 48.98%. Thus, we can see there is a clear benefit of using compression; for the file with
the median time difference, data transfer with compression on was twice as fast as transfer
with compression off.
The second set of results were the IO graphs for each dataset. These graphs were meant
to demonstrate that the idle-time filling was indiscernible from the actual data transfer. For
52
all the datasets except Zero String, idle-time filling was almost indiscernible from the actual
data transfer, except for a momentary spike due to the latency in the artificial bandwidth
reduction. For the Zero String data, however, the bandwidth decreased significantly while
the actual data transfer as the entire packet buffer was compressed to a negligible size and
therefore only a small amount of data was sent over the network, though the time taken for
buffer compression stayed almost the same as in case of the other datasets.
The third set of results were the packet size statistics for each dataset. Here we find that
there were packets with only three unique sizes in the traffic of all the datasets.
1. 1514 bytes for the actual data and the idle-time filling data
2. 66 bytes for TCP acknowledgment packets
3. 78 bytes for TCP window size update packets.
Hence the VPN successfully maintained constant sized packets.
The fourth set of results were the inter-packet arrival times. From these graphs of inter-
packet arrival times vs. time, a clear distinction could be seen between the actual and the
idle-time filling data transfer. The reason for this was that, in order to imitate the bandwidth
usage behavior of the actual data, the idle-time filling data was delayed for a certain amount
of time before being sent over the network (so as to emulate the compression and buffering
process of the actual data). Therefore, our VPN fails at hiding the difference between actual
and idle-time filling data in the context of inter-packet arrival times.
As we can see our VPN successfully achieved a faster data transfer rate through adaptive
compression, hiding traffic characteristics like bandwidth usage differences between when
the user is active vs. idle, and packet sizes, but it failed in hiding the information leakage
through inter-packet arrival times. While our project is a success, this leaves a scope of
improvement for the VPN.
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In order to improve the VPN, we could use the concept of multithreading to our ad-
vantage. In our implementation, since there is only a single thread, maintaining a fixed
bandwidth usage for the idle-time filling and valid data becomes challenging. In order to
maintain that rate, the inter-packet arrival times got modified in a way that traffic charac-
teristics were leaked. This VPN could be further modified to have two threads running in
parallel, where one thread handles sending a fixed chunk of data at a fixed interval, and
the other handles all the processing of the valid data. Whenever there would be valid data
to be sent, it would be copied into the buffer about to be sent out by the thread respon-
sible for sending data along with the necessary padding. In case of no data being there
in that buffer before the time interval ends, idle-time filling can be sent out instead. This
method could potentially lead to a constant bandwidth without leaking any other critical
traffic information. Also, the system could be tested against TA classifiers to demonstrate
the effectiveness empirically, instead of just statistical analysis.
Since this VPN compresses data, it most probably is more energy efficient than a VPN
without compression, as it leads to lesser packets being sent over the network. We could
measure the energy differences between VPN with and without compression. Since the
idle-time filling data would increase the energy consumption, we can add an option to turn
it off, if the user prefers the extra energy efficiency over the security. Another option would
be to explore having the VPN installed and running on both ends of a dedicated network
connection with multiple clients simultaneously connecting to it. In this way, individual
clients might have more energy savings because they are not responsible for generating
idle data, etc.
Another addition to the VPN could be to send the data with variable bandwidth, cho-
sen according to the bandwidth of the network. An investigation could also be performed
to check if having variable bandwidth could also lead to a potential side-channel attack
inferring traffic characteristics through the variations in bandwidth.
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